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Wendell Cox
Dreams into nightmares: the
housing affordability time bomb
Wendell Cox
Only natural disasters or manipulated markets can cause price rises on
the scale we have witnessed in our housing markets, argues Wendell Cox.
As noted in The New City February
editorial (‘Workers flee Sydney's
unaffordable housing’), there is plenty of reason to be concerned about
Sydney’s future and, for that matter, the future of Australia’s working
families. The Third AnnualDemographia International Housing
Affordability Survey starkly illustrates the reality – housing
affordability has become a thing of the past. The great Australian dream
is being transformed into the elite Australian dream. Literally hundreds
of thousands, even millions, of households excluded from the dream are
being forced into a great Australian nightmare of perpetual renting.
As the survey shows, housing affordability crises of such magnitude are
found only where urban consolidation or ‘smart growth’ land rationing
practices have been implemented. Where the urban consolidation ideology
has been resisted, housing affordability remains at historic norms,
generally with median house price to median household income ratios
(‘median multiples’) of 3.0 or less.
We have been heartened by the generally positive reaction to the survey
in Australia and around the world. The general agreement with our
analysis is not surprising, given the strong body of research that has
reached similar conclusions and the consistency of those findings with
fundamental economic principles.
Half-economic analyses
The few criticisms of our survey settle on what may be characterised as
‘half-economic’ analyses that blame demand for the loss of
affordability. They are called ‘half-economic’ because they attribute
price rises to demand alone, ignoring the role of supply.
The most persistent (and wrong) of the criticisms is from Rory Robertson
of Macquarie Bank. In examining US housing markets, Robertson commits a
major error by using local authority data to estimate housing market
(metropolitan area) demand. This is akin to using Sydney city council
area (local authority) or even Penrith data to evaluate the entire
Sydney area. In the US, as in Australia, metropolitan areas (housing
markets) comprise multiple local authority areas (hundreds in some
cases). It is not surprising that this flawed methodology produces
spurious results. He declares many markets to have declining
populations, when in fact all have had population increases. Robertson
facetiously labels many US and Canadian urban areas as ‘dull’ (others
‘sexy’) and dumbfoundingly dismisses Houston as an unacceptable place to
live based upon his former fiancee’s opinion. That this is published
under the moniker of a respected international bank is all the more
puzzling.
The law of supply and demand
However, even where research methods are right, half-economic analyses
are just not enough. Prices are not driven by a ‘law of demand’; rather,
it is the ‘law of supply and demand’ that is at work. Demand in and of
itself does not raise prices. That occurs only where there are
constraints on supply. No amount of ink or rhetoric will justify denying
the obvious fact that supply restrictions are the proximate cause of the
housing affordability crisis in Sydney, Perth and the other large
Australian markets. Moreover, virtually all of the unaffordable markets,
from Australia to the American West Coast to the United Kingdom, were
affordable before overly restrictive land use planning policies and
practices created land shortages.
Supply constraints are the problem
Moreover, the difference between affordable and unaffordable
international markets could not be clearer – where there are significant
land use restrictions, markets have become unaffordable. Where there are
no significant land use restrictions, markets remain affordable.
Affordable markets include Atlanta, Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston, the
three fastest growing markets with populations above 4 million in the
surveyed nations (and indeed in the high-income world).
The depth of the crisis
Despite the substantial attention that the housing affordability crisis
has received in Australia, the ultimate likely damage does not appear to
be comprehended, at least where it counts: in government circles.
In little more than a decade, the price of land for housing development
has risen more than any other element in the consumer price index. Even
Typhoon Larry was unable to inflict so great a price increase on the
fruit element of the CPI, not even temporarily. The land price increase
has been more than double that of petrol. Prices only rise with such a
vengeance in manipulated markets (such as OPEC-dominated petrol) or
where natural disasters inflict short term increases.
The depth of the crisis is illustrated by housing affordability trends
over the past decade. In Sydney, for example, the rise in the median
multiple converts into an increase of approximately $500,000 to pay for
and finance the median priced house over just a decade. This is,
astoundingly, eight years of median household income. The situation is
even worse in Perth, where the increase is the equivalent of eleven
years of median household income. Even in low-demand Adelaide, urban
consolidation has added the equivalent of seven years income to the cost
and financing of the median priced house. Few if any government policies
in history have inflicted such horrendous losses on future generations
in so short a time.
Spilling into rental markets
Not surprisingly, the destructive urban consolidation policies are now
filtering into rental markets, as evidenced by increasing media
attention and federal proposals to provide rental assistance. As ACOSS
President Lyn Hatfield Dodds told the ABC, ‘It’s the availability of
land, it’s the affordability of land.’
The economic price
Suffice to say that taking hundreds of thousands of dollars out of
household budgets to pay for housing will crowd out other spending.
Households with less discretionary income will be less affluent and will
have less money to spend on the consumer goods that create jobs. All of
this will weaken the Australian economy, as will become clearer as lower
cost older mortgages are replaced by the new far more expensive
mortgages that are the reward of urban consolidation.
There could be even more crowding out. More of Australia’s young,
talented professionals might be attracted to other shores, where they
can own former great Australian dream homes at affordable prices. Some
might, for example, leave Perth (or Sydney) for information technology
hub Austin, Texas, and gain more than a decade’s worth of income (before
even considering the much higher incomes in Austin).
Of course, most will not leave. Many will be condemned instead to a
lifetime of renting and an inability to save and invest as their parents
achieved through rising home equity. Others who buy will pay so much
that their long term savings will be far less than would have been the
case without the plague of urban consolidation.
Reaction in the United States
The underlying economic effect of overpriced housing can be seen in the
stunning internal migration losses from coastal markets in the United
States. According to US Bureau of Census data, more than a net 2.5
million people have moved from the most unaffordable ‘housing bubble’
markets in just five years. Within the last decade, each of these
markets had been far more affordable, but has since seen smart growth
land rationing destroy affordability.
US Federal Reserve Board research indicates that markets with overly
restrictive land use policies tend to grow less than would otherwise be
expected. Whether this leads to long-term laggard economic performance
(as seems to be developing in NSW) or a strong downward correction to
bring overvalued housing prices back to reality cannot be known for
sure. It is, however, clear that where housing affordability has been
destroyed by urban consolidation, households and economies will suffer,
whether in Sydney, Perth, San Francisco or Vancouver.
Pseudo-solutions
All manner of non-solutions have been proposed by governments. Some
would provide a few thousand dollars more in grants to new home buyers.
Others would reduce or eliminate stamp duties. More recently, shared
equity schemes have been proposed. In the abstract, these proposals may
or may not have merit. What they all have in common, however, is their
virtual irrelevance to the housing affordability crisis. First home
buyer grants and stamp duty relief are pittances compared to the
hundreds of thousands of dollars that urban consolidation has added to
the price of housing in just a few years. Shared equity would only
further institutionalise the current unsustainable imbalance between
housing costs and incomes. Finally, each of these programs would drive
prices up even further in the absence of effective supply side measures,
primarily releasing enough land to meet demand.
Immediate action required
There is no point in manipulating economics to deny the reality. The
great Australian dream will be needlessly lost for most future
households unless effective programs are implemented to restore it. As
the survey indicates, to restore the dream requires sufficient land to
be developed to meet demand and reduce land prices on the periphery to
realistic rather than trumped-up values. Further, Sydney’s burdensome
and inequitable infrastructure charges must be removed, with community
infrastructure being paid for by the community, not new home buyers. The
solutions are simple to enunciate, yet difficult to implement in a
complex political environment. But the future demands no less.
Wendell Cox is co-author of the Demographia International Housing
Affordability Survey. He is principal of Demographia in metropolitan St.
Louis (USA) and serves as a visiting professor at the Conservatoire
National des Arts et Metiers in Paris.